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NotesandDiscussions
Hegelon ReferenceandKnowledge
Hegelclaimedthatthe objectof thoughtis the universal.Sinceknowledgeinvolves
thought,this seemsto imply that knowledgeof particulars,or what Hegel called
individuals,is impossible.Butcarefuldistinctionsmustbemadebeforethisinterpreta-
tionof Hegel can be endorsed.I would like to look more closelyat an argument
commonlysupposedto supportthisthesisandshowthatwhatis reallyat issueis the
immediacyof our knowledgeof individuals,i.e.,whetherwe haveany knowledgeof
individualsthatisnotmediatedbyuniversals.In thisargumentHegeldeniesonlythat
we haveany immediateknowledgeof individuals.How a denialof the possibilityof
knowledgeof individualsmustbe interpretedin Hegel'ssystemwill be discussed
brieflyin the final sectionsof thispaper,whentherole of referencein knowledgeis
exploredmorefully. While thediscussionherewill focuson suchlinguisticitemsas
namesanddemonstratives,therearecrucialphilosophicalquestionsaboutthenature
of meaningandknowledgewhichhangin thebalance.
The argumentof Hegel'swithwhichI amprimarilyconcernedoccursin thefirst
chapterof thePhenomenologyof Spirit,1"Sense-Certainty."Sense-certaintyistheattitude
thattakestrueknowledgetobetheimmediatepresenceof anobjecttoconsciousness,
eschewingall categorization.But, Hegelreplies,anyattemptto expressone'sknowl-
edgeinvolvescategories,eventheuseof suchapparentlynon-categorialwordsas'this',
'here',and'now'.Sinceknowledgemustbeexpressedif it istobepreservedor commu-
nicated,expressibilityis a necessaryconditionof knowledge,for wecouldhardlycall
somethingknowledgethatcouldneitherbe rememberednor communicated.Sucha
categoriallyimpoverishedword as'this'expressesthepoorest,ratherthantherichest
andtruest,formof cognition.Howeverrich thesensuousmanifoldmaybe,it doesnot
itselfconstituteanykindof knowledge.
The aboveis but a rough sketch,but myfirstconcernhereis withwhya certain
interpretationand kind of reply to this argumentwill not work. We can find this
interpretationandreplyin at leastfour placesin thecontemporaryliterature.a D. W.
1 Referencesto Hegel'stextshavebeenabbreviatedin thebodyof thispaper.The following
editionswereused:Hegel'sPhenomenologyof Spirit, trans.A. V. Miller (Oxford:Oxford University
Press,1977),abbreviatedasPhS, andPhanomenologiedesGeistes,ed.J. Hoffmeister,6thed.(Ham-
burg: F. Meiner, 1952),abbreviatedasPhG. Hegel'sScienceof Logic, trans.A. V. Miller (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1969),abbreviatedasSL; WissenschaftderLogik, ed.G. Lasson(Hamburg:F.
Meiner,1934),Vol. 2,abbreviatedasWdL.
• D. W. Hamlyn,Sensationand Perception:A Histuryof thePhilosophyof Perception(NewYork:
HumanitiesPress,1961),140-46;IvanSoli,An IntroductiontoHegel'sMetaphysics(Chicago:Univer-
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Hamlyn'sstatementof thisinterpretationis theearliestof theseandisquitelucid.He
takesthepoint of theargumentto be thatbecausedemonstrativesareuniversals,we
cannotusethemto refer to particulars,andbecausetheydo notsuccessfullyrefer to
particulars,knowledgephrasedin termsof themcannotbeknowledgeof a particular.
He thenrepliesto theargumentthatsuchdemonstratives,andpropernamesaswell,
for thatmatter,do indeedrefer, and thusthereis no problemaboutknowledgeof
particulars.
Words like 'red' are normallyappliedto manythingspredicatively;we usesuch
wordstocharacterizethings.Wedo notnormallyuse'this'in thatway,but in order
to refer to things.The fact thatwe use the word 'this'to refer to a numberof
differentthingson differentoccasionsdoesnot showthatit is like 'red' in its use.
Words like 'this'werefastenedon by Hegeliansfor thesamereasonastheywere
fastenedon bytheir lateropponents--e.g.,Russell-heeausetheyweresupposedto
be the lastditch in a defenceof knowledgeof particulars.If thesewordsdid not
guaranteeparticularity,whatwould?But theconsiderationswhichmakeit implausi-
bletotreatthesewordsasgeneralwordsof thesamekindas'red'applyequallytoall
thosewordswhichwe useto refer to particularthings,e.g.,proper names.If we
have,therefore,the meansof referring to particulars,thereseemsno remaining
objectiontotheviewthatwemayhaveknowledgeof particularsalso.5
This interpretationof theargumentissimplywrong:in thefirstsectionof thispaperI
showthatHegeldoesnot denythatwecansuccessfullyrefer to particulars,whether
withnamesor withdemonstratives.After discussingtherelevantsimilaritiesanddiffer-
encesbetweennamesand demonstrativesfrom Hegel'spointof view,I shalldiscuss
howHegel'snotionof theroleof singularreferentialdeviceswithinknowledgeismost





salsareindependentof hisown proprietaryandratherpeculiarconceptionof a con-
creteuniversal.Every cognitivestateinvolvesrelationto someuniversal,whether
abstractor concrete;only the adequacyand richness.of the cognitivestatedepend
uponwhethertheuniversalisabstractor concrete.I shallthereforemakenoparticular
mentionof theabstractnessor concretenessof theuniversalsinvolvedin our cognitive
states.
1.
Hegeldoesnot deny thatsuchtermsas 'this'and 'here',or proper names,for that
matter,canandoftendo successfullyrefer to individuals.The crucialquestionposed
sityof ChicagoPress,1969),91-110;GilbertPlumer,"Hegelon SingularDemonstrativeRefer-
ence,"SouthwestemJournalof Philosophy(1980):71-94;M. J. Inwood,Hegel (London:Routledge
andKeganPaul,1983),311-17.
s Hamlyn,Sensationand Perception,1411-43.
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by Hegel in the"Sense-Certainty"chapterof thePhenomenologyis "whetherin sense-
certaintyitselftheobjectis in factthekind of essencethatsense-certaintyproclaimsit
to be;whetherthisnotionof it astheessencecorrespondsto thewayit is presentin
sense-certainty"(PhS, 59;PhG, 81).The questionis not, then,whattheobjectis, or
whatpredicatesit takes,butwhetherit is thekind of objectsense-certaintycangeta
grip on. The attitudeof sense-certaintypresupposesa certainviewof thenatureof
objectsandaviewof thenatureof theknowledgerelationshipthatrevealstheobjectto
the knower.What fuels the dialectichere is the discrepancybetweenwhat sense-
certaintybelievesknowingan objectis and whatsense-certaintycanactuallyachieve.
But it isclearupon readingtherestof Hegel'sargumentthatheneverdeniesour
abilityto refer, but rathercountson our abilityto refer to gethis argumentoff the
~und. If we ask"What is now?"we may(giventhatit is thattimeof day)correctly
answer"Now is night."Hegelatno timedeniesthecorrectnessof thereferencehere.
Someoneunfamiliarwith Hegelianterminologymightbe temptedto think thathe
doesdenythis,for heimmediatelyproceedstoquestionthetrothof thisassertion.But
truthand correctnessarenot thesamefor Hegel.4 Questionsof truth arequestions
abouttheagreementof somethingwithitsessence,theextenttowhichit livesup toits
ideal.Sense-certaintybelievesthatthehereand nowis thesoletruth, theessenceof
objectiveexperience.But, Hegel claims,"a truth cannotloseanythingthroughour
preservingit" (PhS, 60;PhG, 81).Ifwe takesense-certaintyseriously,wefind that"The
Now thatis Night ispreseroed,i.e.it is treatedaswhatit professestobe,assomething
thatis; but it provesitselfto be,on thecontrary,somethingthatis not." For wehave
lookedat the preservedassertionin the cold light of day."The Now doesindeed
preserveitself,butassomethingthatisnotnight"(PhS, 60;PhG, 81).In otherwords,in
eachcasetheassertionsuccessfullyrefers;in onecasewhatit saysisincorrect.Correct-




seemsto meto bethis:Their singularity,theirveryhere-and-nowness,is whatsense-
certaintytakestobecrucialto theobjectsof our experience,andcorrelatively,it takes
knowledgetobedirectpresenceor acquaintance.But thisisatotallyinadequatenotion
of whattheessenceof an objectof our experienceis, for if theobjectwereexhausted
by its presenceto us, it wouldnot.bedistinctfrom theexperienceof it. The objectof
experiencegoesbeyondexperience.Sense-certainty'sinadequacyissufficientlydemon-
stratedbythefactthatthemostappropriateexpressionof immediate xperiencedoes
notpickoutthesameobject wice;it is impossiblefor sense-certaintyoidentifyobjects
acrossexperiences.Thus it is crucialto Hegel'sargumentsthat'this'cansuccessfully
refer nowto a tree,nowto a house,for it is preciselytheinconstancyof theobjectit
picksout thatshowsthat 'this'is not an adequateexpressionfor the essenceof the
objectsof experience.
4 Soilseemsnottonoticethecorrectness/truthdistinctionin hisrebuttaltoHegel'sargument.
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We mayput the point a slightlydifferentway,I believe.The words'this','here',
'now',etc.,alldemonstratives,dohavemeaning,howeverabstractordifficulttoformu-
lateexactly.And thismeaningremainsconstanthroughoutall theusesof theterms.
However,thesetermsplaytherole of non-characterizing,context-dependent,refer-
ringexpressions.Thus, theiractualreferenceisdeterminednotjustbytheirmeaning,
butalsobythecontextof theiruse.Anythingatall isa possiblereferentof 'this';thus,
in knowingsomethingtobea 'this'oneknowsnothingatallaboutit.Onegetsbeyond
the uninformative'this'only in the predicateof thejudgmentor in the contextual
presuppositionsof theactof referring.
2.
That thisis Hegel'sviewreceivessupportfrom thefactthathemakesa similarargu-
mentaboutpropernames.In consideringajudgmentlike"God is theeternal,"Hegel
asserts"In a propositionof thiskind onebeginswiththeword'God'.This byitselfisa
meaninglessound,a merename;it is only thepredicatethatsayswhatGod is, gives
Him contentandmeaning.Only in theendof thepropositiondoestheemptybegin-
ningbecomeactualknowledge"(Preface,PhS, 12-13;PhG, 22).Any internallyunstruc-
tured,purereferringexpressions,suchaspropernamesordemonstratives,areuninfor-
mativeandemptyaccordingtoHegel.!;
This positionisnotimmediatelyevident,for it canbeeasilyclaimedthatnoisolated
expressionis informative.A predicate,suchas'red'or 'eternal',doesnotitselfinform
usof anythinguntil it findsapositionin aproposition;it seemstobenodifferentfrom
a purereferringexpressionin thisregard.But thisis goingtoofar, for predicatesare
thepredicatestheyarebecauseof therelationstheybearto otherpredicates.These
relationsinclude exclusion(e.g.,betweenred and green),inclusion(e.g.,between
bachelorandman),andpresupposition.
It is importantto rememberherethataccordingto Hegelconceptsareessentially
thekind of thing'thatcanplaytheroleof a middletermin a syllogism.And whatis
essentialaboutthisrole is theabilityto unify theuniversalandtheindividual,repre-
sentedby themajorand minor terms.But syllogisms(or moregenerally,inferences)
areexplanatorydevicesweusetoincreaseor communicateour understanding.Wecan
developa measureof relative'cognitivecontent'for concepts,givenHegel'stheory:a




referring expressions,Hegel also takesthere to be a fundamentalmetaphysicalproblem-
namely,whentakenseriously,theideaof a purereferringexpressionseemstocommitustothe
ideaof a pure referent,whatwenowcalla bareparticular.Hegeltakesbareparticularsto be
nonsensical.The epistemologicaland metaphysicaldimensionsof referringexpressionscanbe
keptseparatefor our purpose,though.
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will playan importantrole in a numberof illuminatingexplanatoryinferences.Con-
cepts,butnotnames,havecognitivecontent.6
Namesare not similarlyembeddedwithina complexwebof inferentialrelation-
ships,or to theextentthattheyare,theylosethecharacterof a purereferringexpres-
sionandbeginto havetheconceptualcontentcharacteristicof predicates.There has
beena long debateover whetherproper nameshavesensesor not, but whatJohn
Searlehascalledthe"classical"accountinsiststhattheydo not.?There areproblems
generatedbysuchaposition,butit seemsclearthatHegelagreeswithMill in accepting
a versionof this"classical"theoryof propernames.The lackof a senseis,at leastin
part,dueto thefactthata nameisnotembeddedin a networkof conceptualrelations
in thewaypredicatesare.Argumentsto theeffectthatpropernamesdo havesenses
oftendependupon the factthatcertainnamesdo indeedacquiresome,perhapsill-
defined,"conceptual"relationswith somepredicateterms.sProper namesare be-
stowedtotallyarbitrarily(atleastasfar asa logicianisconcerned);in ordertobegiven
a certainnamethereare no criteriathe objectmustsatisfy,whereasin order for a
certainpredicateto beapplied,thereare(oftenhighlycomplex)criteriathatmustbe
satisfied.Again, names,unlike descriptions,do not tell us how to individuatethe
objectsreferred to, exceptinsofaras thereare certainconventionsaboutreserving





changed"(WdL I: 104-5,mytrans.;SL, 117).
Thus, namesdo not havecognitivecontentaccordingto Hegel;only predicates
havesuchcontent.9









1, Chap.2, ~5);John Searle,"ProperNamesandDescriptions,"in Encyclopediaof Philosophy,
editedbyPaulEdwards,(NewYork:Macmillan,1967),6:487-91;LeonardLinsky,Namesand
Descriptions(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1977),7;SaulKripke,"NamingandNecessity,"
in Semanticsof Natural Language, editedbyDonaldDavidsonandGilbertHarman(Dordrecht:
Reidel,1972);HilaryPutnam,"MeaningandReference,"TheJournal of Philosophy70(November
8,1973):699-711.




~ 9 The exegeticalproblemsareactuallythornierthanI havepaintedthemhere.In the
discussionsoflanguageintheEncyclopedia~~459-64Hegeltreatsallnon-logicalwordsasnames.It
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3·
It would now be convenientto assertthatnot only are nameslackingin cognitive
content,but so are demonstratives.But thiswouldclearlydo Hegel injustice.Hegel
claimsthatdemonstrativesare universals;he doesnot claimthatnamesare.Rather,
demonstrativesare a limit caseof cognitivecontent,in that theyhaveas little as
possible.
Definitedescriptionseemclearlytohavesomecognitivecontent:theycharacterize
the object,allowingone to makecertaininferencesaboutthe objectbasedon the
characterization.Mostdefinitedescriptionsrequirerelativizationtoacontextin order
to sortout thereferencemade.Demonstrativesaresimilarly,thoughmoreobviously,
contextdependent.In a puredemonstrativereferenceseeminglyall characterization
of theobjecthasdroppedaway,andit is thecontextalone(withperhapshelpfrom a
gesture)that supposedlysufficesto fix the reference.But thatcontextwill specify
certaincharacteristicsthatthedemonstratedobjectshouldhave,just asthepredicates
in thedefinitedescriptiondid.
Descriptivereferenceis mediatedby universals,by predicates.Hegel'spositionis




1. In both, a changein contextcaneasilyproducea changein reference.'The
tallestmanin theroom'will refer to differentpeoplein differentrooms,and, if the
occupantsof a roomchange,it mayeasilyacquirea newreferencein thesameroom.
Herethereferencedependsuponthesatisfactionof certaincriteria,andthethingthat
satisfiesthecriteriaisreferredto,whateverit is.This isnotthecasefor names-atleast
givena Millian theoryof names.'This', 'here',and'now'alsochangereferenceasthe
contextchanges.Again this is a matterof the satisfactionof certaincriteria (e.g.,
saliencyin theenvironment),but thesecriteriaareoftensominimalthatit is difficult
for themnot to be satisfied.How a demonstrativerefersis more similarto how a
descriptionrefersthantohowanamerefers.
2. Descriptivereferenceinvokesa conceptualschemeallowingonetomakecertain
inferencesabouttheobject.'The tallestmanin theroom'allowsone to makeinfer-
seemsevidentthat,whetheror not it washisconsideredview,hewasstronglytemptedbya 'two-
name'theoryofjudgment.Here heagainshowsaffinitiesto Mill. Furthermore,in commonwith
otherexponentsof the"newwayof ideas,"Hegeltooksuchwordsto nameideas(or ashecalled
them,representations;ee~~459and461).Yet he distinguishesthenamesavailablei~a language
fromthe"formalfactorin language,"whichis the"workof theunderstanding"and"givesriseto
what is grammatical"(~459).Actually this theoryof namesmayhavesavedHegel from the
difficultiesthata two-nametheoryof judgmentmustotherwisefall into. Hegelrecognizesthat
grammaticalstructuremakesa veryimportantcontributionbeyondanythingthatthevocabulary
itselfcanprovide.This allowshim to treatsubjectsand predicates,evenif bothare names,as
differentlyas their grammaticalroles.Cf. P. T. Geach,"Historyof theCorruptionsof Logic,"
LogU Matters,44-61.
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encesaboutthe geneticmake-upof the objecttalkedabout,its approximatespatial
location,and,if weallowwhatcanbeinferredwithsomeprobability,wecanconcludea
greatdealmore.The doctrineof meaninglessnameswill allowno inferenceson the
basisof a namealone.Certaindemonstratives,however,do carrywiththemlicenseto
makesomeinferences.'Now' indicatesthatwhatis beingreferredto is a time;'here'
indicatesthata placeor areais beingreferredto. Nevertheless,it is obviousthatthe
inferencesonecanmakeon thebasisof demonstrativereferencealoneareverymini-
mal;thissupportsthethesisthattheyhaveonlyminimalcognitivecontent.
3. The definitedescriptionrubric, 'the ', requirescompletionwith some
predicateexpression.The demonstrativerubric 'this ' admitssuchcomple-




Much of what I havesaidaboutdemonstratives,however,canalsobe appliedto
propernames,for theytooshiftreferencefromcontexttocontext.'John Smith'names
manydifferentpeople,andwhichpersonis in factpickedout in a specificutterance
dependsuponcontextualfactors.Namesalsotendtooffercluestosomecharacteristics






The differencebetweennamesand demonstrativesmightbe summedup asfol-
lows:Namesaretoodeterminatein theirmodeof referencetocharacterizewhatthey
referto;purenamestellusnothingabouttheobject,becauseall theydo is refer to it.
Demonstratives,on theotherhand,aretooindeterminatetocharacterizetheobjectof
referencein aconceptuallyusefulway;theytellusnothingabouttheobjectotherthan






particularsdependsupontheabilityto refer to them,for wecertainlycouldnotknow
10 We do saythingslike 'There werethreeRockefellersat theconcert'.Suchpluralizations
areeitherequivalento statementsof theform 'Thereweresomanythingscalled " or
dependupon thenamesbeingdoledout in accordancewithcertainnon-linguisticcriteria,thus
removingthemfromthecategoryof pureMilliannamesin whichweareinterested.
11 The contextprobablyprovidesus with a sortalthat tellsus whatsort of thing we are
lookingfor. But thisispresupposed,notsaid.
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of somethingthatwecouldnot evenrefer to.Manythinkershavebeenseducedinto
believingthatdifferent modesof referenceare correlatedwith differentmodesof
epistemologicalccess.The advantageof sucha positionis thatthetheoryof meaning
andthetheoryof knowledgethenexhibitelegantandimportantparallels.
This raisesthequestionof whetherHegelassumedthereto be a correlationbe-
tweenmodesof referenceand modesof epistemologicalaccess.A comparisonwith
Russellwill be instructive,for thereis much to be learnedfrom the late,lamented
Lord, if only from the error of his ways.Between1905and 1913(or later)Russell
nevershook the idea that for non-logicaltermsmeaningwas,in the lastanalysis,
reference.For our sentencesto be meaningfultheyhad to consistultimatelyof (1)
logicalwords,whichdeterminedthelogicalform of thesentence,and (2) non-logical
words,whichsuccessfullyreferredeitherto particularsor universals,dependingon
theword.In ordertoknowatruth,Russellarguedthatwemustfirsthaveknowledgeof
thecomponentsof thetruth.Thus, in ordertomakeour knowledgeof truthsintelligi-
ble,therehadtobeaformof knowledgeprior toanyknowledgeof truths.Knowledge
byacquaintancefillsjust thisrole.Just asthemeaningfulnessof a sentenceis guaran-
teedby the fact thatall its non-logicalwordsdenote(andthat it is well-formed,of
course),our knowledgeof a truth presupposesknowledgeof theconstituentsof the
judgment,adifferentandimmediateformof knowledge.II
That universalsare thingswithwhichwecanbedirectlyacquaintedis no longera
verypopular view.Hegel too would rejectthe reificationof universals,for it is an
almosttooperfectexemplificationof theapproachheinsistsiscommontoall "philoso-
phiesof theunderstanding."The meaningof apredicateisnotsomething-likeuniver-
salthatit names.'SIn contrastto Russell,Hegeltookpredicatetermsto beverbs,not
covertnames.If oneholdssucha theoryof universals,thereisno needandno usefor
the idea of acquaintancewith a universalin order to understandthis part of our
knowledgeof truths.'4Indeed,sincepredicatesdo not refer, a correlationbetween
referenceandepistemologicalaccesswill notexplainthecognitiveroleof predicates.
What role do namesand demonstrativesplay in knowledge?In the Russellian
u Russelloftentalksasifthe verythingswithwhichweareacquaintedareconstituentsof the
judgment,towhichshouldbecontrastedHegel'sinsistencethatwecannotsaythethingitself.See
Russell'sProblemsof Philosophy(Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress,1912),chapters3, 4, and 12;
"On Denoting"in Logic and KnowledgeeditedbyRobertC. Marsh(NewYork: Macmillan,1956)
55-56.
'5 Actually,as I havealreadypointedout, for Hegelthe 'meaning'of a predicateword is a
'universal'thatit 'names'-namely,thethoughtin themindof thespeaker.The thought'smean-
ingfulnessisnot itselfderivedfrom thefactthatit namessomeuniversalwhichleadsa thing-like
modeof existencein somenebulousPlatonicheaven.Furthermore,Hegelinsiststhatthoughtis
primarilyan activity,thinking. Having a certainthoughtis thinkinga certainway.The verbal
natureof theuniversalisretained.
'4 Our knowledgeof universalsis ultimatelylike an agent'sknowledgeof whathe is doing,
whichis not at all like acquaintance.Seemy paper "Hegelon Thought and Representation,"
ldealistu Studies17(May 1987):123-32;alsoCharlesTaylor, "Hegeland thePhilosophyof Ac-
tion,"Hegel'sPhilosophyof Action, ed. LawrenceS. Stepelevichand DavidLamb (AtlanticHigh-
lands,N.].: HumanitiesPress,1983).
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paradigm-and heremanypeoplestillagreewithhim-singular referenceguarantees
thatour knowledgereallydoeshook up with the world. Russellwasconvincedthat
therehadtobesomeplacewherethehookupwasunbreakablein orderfor knowledge
to be possible.In acquaintanceknowledgeis directlyand immediatelyrelatedto the
world.Russellbelievedthattheonlylogicallypropernamesweredemonstrativesrefer-
ring to theobjectsof directacquaintance:sense-data,memories,theself,anduniver-
sals.
How Hegelwouldreplyto Russellshouldnowbeclear:directacquaintanceis not
necessaryto guaranteethatknowledgehooksup with thespatio-temporalworld.De-
monstrativereferenceis notreferenceunmediatedbyuniversals;itsbasicform isthat
of a description,yetitsconditionsfor successaresomeagerthatit doesguaranteea
sufficienthookup with the naturalworld.'5To think of demonstrativesasnamesis
simplytomisconstruethem.
But,accordingto Hegel,namesdo playarolein connectingour thoughtswiththe
world.Yet, thereferencerelationis notitselfcognitive,andnamesthemselvescontain
noinformation.Havinganamein mindisevidenceof knowledgeof anobjectonlyif it
canbeusedtomaketruejudgmentsabouttheobject.Russellhadnotfullylearnedthat
wordsareprimarilycomponentsof judgmentsandgainmeaningonlywithinajudg-
ment.Instead,he insistedon lookingfor an independentandself-subsistentmeaning
andepistemologicalsignificancefor all non-logicalconstituentsof a proposition.But
thefundamentalsortof knowledgeisknowledgeof truths(in Russell'sense),andany ,
knowledgeof thingsis (consistsin) aknowledgeof truthsaboutthesethings.Anyother,
moredirectrelationwemayhavetothethingisnotacognitiverelation.
5·
To presenta full picture of the role in knowledgethat Hegel assignsto singular
referentialdevices,I mustpointoutonefurtherthesisHegelaccepted:In trueknowl-
edge,noreferencetoanyindividualoccurs.This isasensein whichit istruethatHegel
deniesthatthereis knowledgeof individuals.But thisis trueonlyof theveryhighest
formof knowledge,absoluteknowledge.This formof knowledgeisexperiencedincho-
atelyin Art andReligionandachievedexplicitlyonlyin Philosophy,whenweunder-
standtheworld, as it were,from a "God's-eyepoint of view."To seewhy absolute
knowledgemakesno mentionof individuals,wemustexploretheconnectionbetween
referenceandtherealmof thefinite,for it turnsout thatreferenceby individualsto
otherindividualsisanartifactof thefinite.
I will firstarguethatthehighestformof knowledge,absoluteknowledge,cannot,
accordingto Hegel,containanyreferencetoindividualsperse;I will thenreturntomy
mainpointandshowwhyit isthecasethatthephenomenonof individualreferencein
humanlanguageisnonethelessindispensable.
Like mostof his predecessors,Hegelbelievedthattherearedifferentdegreesof
'5 AlthoughDavidKaplanwouldprobablynotfind thepresenttreatmentof demonstratives
in the leastcongenial,he offers an interestingargumentalongsimilarlinesthatknowledgeby
acquaintanceisnotneededtoinsurereference(Demonstratives,unpub.ms.).
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being.Furthermore,Hegelandothers(amongthemPlato)heldthattherearedegrees
of knowledgecorrespondingto thedegreesof being.Hegelheldthattheform of all
knowledgeisjudgmental.He believedfurtherthatjudgmentalformsarecapableof a
hierarchicalrankingbasedon theadequacyof theformstotheexpressionof thetruth,
thatis,basedontheadequacyof theformstothearticulationof theworld.




adeterminationof thesubjectwhichdoesn'tstandin therelationof universalityto the
subject-somestateor individualactionor such;'Caesarwasbornin Romein suchand
suchayear,wagedwarfor 10yearsin Gaul,crossedtheRubicon',etc.arepropositions,
notjudgments."'?However,whena propositionis "assertedon thestrengthof some
reasonor other,"it would"partakeof thenatureof ajudgment."'8For in thatcasethe
particularfactsare treatedas universals:reasonis alwaysgeneric.The "relationof
universality"thatholdsbetweentheconceptswithinajudgmentis a rationalconnec-
tion,suchastobeexpressedbyor standbehindarationalinference.
This distinctionis, I believe,parallelwith the truth/correctnessdistinctionmen-
tionedearlier.Propositionsare merelycapableof correctness,judgmentsof truth.
True knowledge-knowledgeof the highestorder-is knowledgeof Truth (witha
capitalT), andthereforejudgmental,notmerelypropositionalin nature.
The ultimateupshotof Hegel'sdoctrinesis thattrueknowledgeis thepursuitof
philosophy.Philosophicaltruthsareunconditionallynecessaryanduniversal.Like the
conditionallynecessaryanduniversaltruthsof empiricalscience,philosophicaltruths
containno referenceto any particular-unless it be the "universalparticular,"the
Absolute-and the true philosophicalcomprehensionof the Absolutewould never
makeessentialuseof directsingularreferencetotheAbsolute.






In theHegeliansystemthefiniteis thatwhichis determinatethroughitscontrast
withotherthingsexternaltoit or separatefromit.Thus, thefinitecomesin individual-
izedchunks.Now thechunksarenot,andcouLdnotbe,mereindividuals,bareparticu-
lars,butmustexemplifyuniversals.Namesarethelinguisticcounterpartsof individu-
.6 Cf. The Logic of Hegel, trans. W. Wallace(Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1892);
Enzyklopedieder philosophischenWissenschaften,eds. F. Nicolin and O. Poggeler(Hamburg: F.
Meiner,1959),~167.Hegel'sScienceofLogic, trans.A. V. Miller (London:AllenandUnwin, 1969),
626; WissenschaftderLogik,ed.G. Lasson(Hamburg:F. Meiner,1934),2:267.
'7 Encyclopedia,~167.
•8 Scienceof Logic, 626.
'9 "SingularTerms,Ontology,and Identity,"Mind 65:260(October1956):451.
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als;it isasimpossibletohavea languagethatconsistsolelyof namesasit is to havea
worldconsistingof bareparticulars."o
If namesarethelinguisticexpressionsof individualityperse,demonstrativerefer-
enceis the linguisticcounterpartof theessentialcontrastiverelativityof individuals.




isonethingin a contextof manyothers.Whereasaneverywhere,everywhendivinity
(which,of course,could not be the HegelianAbsolute)couldusenamesto refer to
individuals,it could not sensiblyusedemonstratives.Demonstrativereferencebrings
outtheindividualityof theknoweraswellastheknown.
Referenceisthenecessaryconditionfor locatingor applyinguniversalstoindividu-
als,andis thusa necessaryconditionfor knowledgeof thefinite.Althoughno particu-
larswouldbereferredto in absoluteknowledge,an absoluteknowermustbeableto
use and understandsingularreferences,for withoutsuchan understandingthere
couldbe no knowledgeof thefinite.And sincein Hegel'sviewthefiniteis contained
withintheinfinite,andnotmerelysetoveragainstit,abeingwithoutknowledgeof the




00. This should not be takento precludethe possibilityof a SellarsianJumblese, for that
consistsof configurednames,notjust names.
••The vagueideaswhichgeneratedthispaperjelled during a mosthelpfuldiscussionwith
Lynn R. Baker, to whom I am very grateful.I havefurther profitedfrom commentsby my
colleague,W. E. Kennick,from SidneyShoemaker,GilbertPlumer,andfromcolloquiaaudiences
at the Universityof Massachusetts,Amherst,and the PacificDivisionof the APA, wheremy
helpfulcommentatorwasG.J. Mattey.
